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THE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION IN
CHOICE-OF-LAW CASES IN NEW YORK
JOSEPH A. KILBOURN*
JEFFREY M. WINN**
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is essential in contract actions to ascertain the reasonable
expectations of the parties to an agreement.1 Commercial agreements, such as insurance and reinsurance contracts, are carefully
drafted in order to achieve certain specific economic objectives.2
The rights and obligations of the parties to such contracts are invariably affected by the substantive law of the various jurisdictions. When disputes arise and the laws of the states or nations
connected with the contract differ, the court must choose which
law to apply.3 Since, however, the prevailing conflict of law rules
are, for the most part, ambiguous and unpredictable,4 contracting
parties have increasingly opted to insert choice-of-law clauses into
their agreements, thus ensuring predictable and desirable results.
Given New York's status as one of the world's major financial,
* B.A. 1948, Yale College; L.L.B. 1952, Columbia University School of Law. Joseph A.
Kilbourn is a Senior Partner in the firm of Bigham Englar Jones & Houston in New York.
** B.A. 1983, University of Iowa; J.D. 1986, Pace University School of Law. Jeffrey M.
Winn is associated with the firm of Bigham Englar Jones & Houston in New York.
1 See Skandia Am. Reins. Corp. v. Schenck, 441 F. Supp. 715, 723-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Miller v. Miller, 22 N.Y.2d 12, 27, 237 N.E.2d 877, 886, 290 N.Y.S.2d 734, 747, remittitur
denied, 22 N.Y.2d 722, 239 N.E.2d 204, 292 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1968); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 67 Misc. 2d 7, 10, 322 N.Y.S.2d 520, 523 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1971), aff'd, 42 App. Div. 2d 1056, 348 N.Y.S.2d 122 (2d Dep't 1973).
2 Gruson, Governing Law Clauses in Commercial Agreements-New York's Approach,
18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323 (1980).
1 Note, Effectiveness of Choice-of-Law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Party
Autonomy or Objective Determination,82 COLUm L. Rav. 1659 (1982).
' Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses in International and Interstate Loan Agreements-New York's Approach, 1982 ILL. L. REv. 207. Reese has observed that "[c]onflict of
laws in the United States is presently in a state of flux and chaos.... IT]here is dispute
over whether there should be rules at all." Reese, Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts and
Directions for the Future, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 1 (1977).
The current rules, although unpredictable and uncertain, afford the jurisdiction with
the greatest interest in the litigation the opportunity to control the legal issues and assert
its policy considerations. See, e.g., infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text (discussing policy considerations).
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commercial, and insurance centers,5 its developed commercial law,
and the belief that New York judges are both competent and
nonparochial, 6 parties engaged in multi-jurisdictional transactions
frequently stipulate that New York law will govern their contract.
Recognizing this status, in 1984 the New York Legislature
added section 5-1401 to the New York General Obligations Law.'
That statute provides for enforcement of the choice of New York
law as the governing law in non-consumer contractual obligations
involving at least $250,000, even if the obligation does not bear a
"reasonable relationship" to the state. However, despite this legislation, New York courts continue to adhere to pre-1984 principles
in interpreting governing law clauses, 9 thus effectively causing the
policy goals of the statute to remain unfulfilled. 10 As a result, liti' See Memorandum of Assemblyman Siegel, reprintedin [1984] N.Y.
157.

LEGIS.

ANN. 156,

, See Gruson, supra note 2, at 325.
Typical language from a governing law clause states: "This Agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the law of the State of New York." See Gruson,
supra note 2, at 324 n.3. Initially, courts were slow in giving effect to choice-of-law clauses
because they were "impeded by the theoretical and erroneous notion that to permit the
parties to choose their law would in effect place them in the role of legislators." Reese,
supra note 4, at 19 (footnote omitted).
S N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney Supp. 1988). The new statute provides
that:
1. The parties to any contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or otherwise,
in consideration of, or relating to any obligation arising out of a transaction covering in the aggregate not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, including a
transaction otherwise covered by subsection one of section 1-105 of the uniform
commercial code, may agree that the law of this state shall govern their rights and
duties in whole or in part, whether or not such contract, agreement or undertaking
bears a reasonable relation to this state. This section shall not apply to any contract, agreement or undertaking (a) for labor or personal services, (b) relating to
any transaction for personal, family or household services, or (c) to the extent
provided to the contrary in subsection two of section 1-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to limit or deny the enforcement of any provision respecting choice of law in any other contract, agreement, or undertaking.
Id.
' See infra notes 144-157 and accompanying text.
10 In addition to General Obligations Law section 5-1401, the New York Legislature
adopted a companion provision to provide for the enforcement of choice-of-forum clauses.
Section 5-1402 provides that:
1. Notwithstanding any act which limits or affects the right of a person to maintain an action or proceeding, including, but not limited to, paragraph (b) of section thirteen hundred fourteen of the business corporation law and subdivision
two of section two hundred-b of the banking law, any person may maintain an
action or proceeding against a foreign corporation, non-resident, or foreign state
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gants continue to face uncertainty as to whether courts will uphold
governing law clauses.
This Article will discuss and analyze the rules of construction
employed by the New York courts in determining whether the parties' choice of law will govern their contractual obligations.
II.

EFFECTIVENESS OF CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES

Perhaps no legal subject has caused more bewilderment among
the bench and bar than choice of law.11 There are several choice of
law theories currently used by the courts,12 thus leaving judges to
wrestle with often irreconcilable and incomprehensive precedents.1 3 This is particularly disturbing because the choice of law
decision is frequently outcome determinative. 4
New York courts employ standard rules of construction in inwhere the action or proceeding arises out of or relates to any contract, agreement
or undertaking for which a choice of New York law has been made in whole or in
part pursuant to section 5-1401 and which (a) is a contract, agreement or undertaking, contingent or otherwise, in consideration of, or relating to any obligation
arising out of a transaction covering in the aggregate, not less than one million
dollars, and (b) which contains a provision or provisions whereby such foreign corporation or non-resident agrees to submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of this
state.
2. Nothing contained in this section shall be cbnstrued to affect the enforcement
of any provision respecting choice of forum in any other contract, agreement or
undertaking.
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1402 (McKinney Supp. 1988). The enforceability of forum selection clauses is beyond the scope of this paper. For a broad overview of forum selection
clauses, see Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., No. 86-1908, slip op. (U.S. June 20, 1988);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515-20 (1974); Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co.,
407 U.S. 1, 8-20 (1972); Gruson, Forum Selection Clauses in Internationaland Interstate
Agreements, 1982 ILL. L. REv. 133.
1 See Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1041 (1987).
'2 See W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 586-87, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1945)
(center of gravity approach); Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972) ("lex fori"
approach); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d
64, 70 (1972) (Fuld's rules); D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAw PRocEss (1965) (Cavers' rules);
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 231, 267, 716 (1963) (interest analy-

sis approach); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT
tionis" approach); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)

OF LAWS § 311 (1934) ("lex
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188

loci contractus/solu(1969) (most signifi-

cant relationship test); Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REv. 267, 282 (1966) (Leflar's approach). For a brief discussion of the various
theories, see Smith, supra note 11, at 1043-50.
2" See Smith, supra note 11, at 1041. This confusion is compounded not only by the
fact that courts do not consistently adhere to a single rule, but also that such courts may at
times cite one rule when they are in fact applying the rationale of another in reaching their
decision. See Reese, supra note 4, at 18.
" See Smith, supra note 11, at 1042.
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terpreting insurance and reinsurance contracts. 15 In absence of a
choice-of-law clause in an insurance contract, courts will either apply a "paramount interest" analysis 6 or a "grouping of contacts"
test" to determine the applicable law. If an insurance contract
does contain a choice-of-law clause, the court will either apply a
"reasonable relationship" test, 8 a "paramount interest" analysis,1 9
or a "grouping of contacts" test.20
A.

No Choice-of-Law Clause

The traditional rules regarding choice of law, as expressed in
the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, provided that the laws
of the place of making and place of performance governed various
aspects of the contract.2 ' In Auten v. Auten,2 2 the New York Court
of Appeals expressly departed from the first Restatement view and
adopted the "grouping of contacts" approach. This approach demands that courts apply the law of the jurisdiction "which has the
15 Sullivan County Gas Serv. v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 111 App. Div. 2d 542, 543,

489 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416 (3d Dep't 1985). For example, in the case of ambiguous language in a
contract of insurance, doubt or uncertainty will be resolved in the insured's favor. United
States Lines Co. v. Eastburn Marine Chem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 881, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
Terms of an insurance contract which are clear and unambiguous, however, must be given
their plain and ordinary meaning; such policies must be enforced as written, and the court is
not free to modify terms by judicial construction. See Breed v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 46
N.Y.2d 351, 355, 385 N.E.2d 1280, 1282, 413 N.Y.S.2d 352, 355 (1978).
11Krauss v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 643 F.2d 98, 101 (2d Cir. 1981); Index Fund, Inc.
v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 580 F.2d 1158, 1162 (2d Cir. 1978); Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Fortress
Re, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 874, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 372, 382, 248 N.E.2d 576, 582, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817, 825 (1969).
17 See Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (1954); American
Home Assur. Co. v. Employers Mut., 77 App. Div. 2d 421, 424-25, 434 N.Y.S.2d 7, 9 (1st
Dep't 1980), aff'd, 54 N.Y.2d 874, 429 N.E.2d 424, 444 N.Y.S.2d 917 (1981).
18 A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d 369, 381, 144 N.E.2d 371, 379, 165
N.Y.S.2d 475, 486 (1957); see Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 590
F. Supp. 18, 20 (S.D.N.Y), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1983).
"' Zanfardino v. E-Systems, Inc., 652 F. Supp. 637, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
2 Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 560-61, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69
(1961); see Keystone Leasing Corp. v. Peoples Protective Life Ins. Co., 514 F. Supp. 841,
847-48 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
21 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§§ 332, 358 (1934). The First Restatement

evinced the "vested rights rule;" the law of the place of making governed the validity and
the effect of a contract ("lex loci contractus"), id. § 332, while issues concerning the breach
or performance of a contract were governed by the law of the place of performance ("lex loci
solutionis"). Id. § 358. The First Restatement left no room for parties to choose the law
governing their contract. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 339 n.48.
22 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
" Id. at 160, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
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'
most significant contacts with the matter in dispute."24

A second theory applied by New York courts is the "para-

mount interest analysis.

'26

In IntercontinentalPlanning,Ltd. v.

Daystrom, Inc.,26

the New York Court of Appeals applied the substantive law of the jurisdiction which had the greatest interest in
the disputed issue. The jurisdiction's "interest" was determined by
analyzing the purpose of the particular law in conflict."
Under both theories, courts generally employ a three-step
analysis. 2s The first step is to identify the issue involved. The para-

mount interest analysis starts with the consideration of the different governmental interests involved, which may vary among issues.29 Although courts utilizing the grouping of contacts test

apparently turn first to the relevant contacts, they must necessarily look to the issue involved in order to decipher the importance

of each contact.3 0
The second step is the identification of the purposes of the
conflicting state laws to determine whether a genuine conflict exists.3 1 Under the paramount interest analysis, this step is expressly

articulated.32 On the other hand, although courts employing the
24 Id. (quoting Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 305, 133 N.E.2d 424, 431
(1953)); see American Home Assur. Co. v. Employers Mut., 77 App. Div. 2d 421, 425, 434
N.Y.S.2d 7, 9 (1st Dep't 1980), ajf'd, 54 N.Y.2d 874, 429 N.E.2d 424, 444 N.Y.S.2d 917
(1981). Prior to Auten, it was clear that New York courts never followed the first Restatement rule in its pure form. Id.; see Hal Roach Studios v. Film Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596,
598 (2d Cir. 1946); Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank,
269 N.Y. 22, 26, 198 N.E. 617, 618, remittitur amended, 269 N.Y. 602, 199 N.E. 69 (1935),
cert. denied, 297 U.S. 705 (1936); Kleve v. Basler Lebens, 182 Misc. 776, 780, 45 N.Y.S.2d
882, 885 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943); Chincilla v. Foreign Tankship Corp., 195 Misc. 895,
901, 91 N.Y.S.2d 213, 218 (N.Y.C. City Ct. N.Y. County 1949), modified on other grounds,
197 Misc. 1058, 97 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950), afl'd, 278 App. Div. 556, 102
N.Y.S.2d 438 (1st Dep't 1951).
25 See Gruson, supra note 4, at 210.
20 24 N.Y.2d 372, 248 N.E.2d 576, 300 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1969).
27 Id. at 382, 248 N.E.2d at 582, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 825-26.
28 Krauss v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 643 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1981); Dym v. Gordon,
16 N.Y.2d 120, 124, 209 N.E.2d 792, 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1965); see Auten, 308 N.Y.
at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
29 Daystrom, 24 N.Y.2d at 384, 248 N.E.2d at 582, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 827; see Fort Howard Paper Co. v. William D. Witter, Inc., 787 F.2d 784, 789-90 (2d Cir. 1986); All State
Vehicles v. Allstate Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 444, 446 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
30 See Reese, Choice of Law: Rules of Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 316 (1972);
Note, supra note 3, at 1679.
21 Dym, 16 N.Y.2d at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466; see Jefferson Ins. Co.
v. Fortress Re, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 874, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
12 See Daystrom, 24 N.Y.2d at 382, 248 N.E.2d at 582, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 825-26; Hart v.
General Motors Corp., 129 App. Div. 2d 179, 185, 517 N.Y.S.2d 490, 493-94 (1st Dep't),
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grouping of contacts test normally do not analyze the policies involved, 3s consideration of these policies is implicit in their analysis;
contacts are not merely grouped together, but are evaluated within
the context of a particular issue. 4
The third step is the examination of the contacts of the competing jurisdictions in order to ascertain which has the closer connection with the case and thus has the superior interest in seeing
its law applied.-5 This step is emphasized in the grouping of contacts approach, 6 but is also implicit in the paramount interest
analysis.3 7
In sum, although the analyses undertaken for the grouping of
contacts and paramount interest tests are not identical, the differences are largely in emphasis.3 '
B.

Choice-of-Law Clauses

A New York court faced with deciding whether a choice-of-law
clause is enforceable has three options: (1) give determinative effect to the clause; (2) ignore the clause; or (3) treat the clause as a
pertinent but not determinative factor.3 In reaching this decision,
the courts employ one of three different approaches: (1) the reasonable relationship test; (2) the grouping of contacts test; or (3)
the paramount interest analysis test.
1.

Reasonable Relationship
The most common approach utilized by New York courts is

appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 608, 515 N.E.2d 910, 521 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1987).
33 See, e.g., American Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta Am. Reins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 112,
118-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
M Note, supra note 3, at 1679; see Jefferson Ins., 616 F. Supp. at 877; Auten, 308 N.Y.
at 161-62, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
35 See Daystrom, 24 N.Y.2d at 382, 248 N.E.2d at 583, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 825-26; Dym, 16
N.Y.2d at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466; Auten, 308 N.Y. at 161-62, 124
N.E.2d at 102.
3' Auten, 308 N.Y. at 161-62, 124 N.E.2d at 102; see American Special, 634 F. Supp. at
118-19.
'7 Note, supra note 3, at 1680; see Daystrom, 24 N.Y.2d at 382, 248 N.E.2d at 583, 300
N.Y.S.2d at 825-26.
SR See Note, supra note 3, at 1680. It has been suggested, however, that the "paramount interest" analysis developed through the merger of the "grouping of contracts" and
the "weighing of interests" analysis which preceded it. See id. This position was espoused
by the New York Court of Appeals in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 481, 191 N.E.2d
279, 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 749 (1963).
3' See Note, supra note 3, at 1661.
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the reasonable relationship test. This approach was first adopted
by the
New York Court of Appeals in A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster
Co.,4 0 in which the court held that a choice of law clause would be
enforced so long as the transaction was "reasonably related" to the
jurisdiction whose law was selected by the parties.4
Demonstrating the resiliency of choice of law clauses in complex circumstances, two New York cases applied the reasonable relationship test in group insurance contract disputes. 2 In Reger v.
National Association of Bedding Manufacturers,' the court was
faced with the issue of whether New York or Illinois law should
apply in determining the manner of termination of a group life insurance policy which contained a choice-of-law clause stipulating
that Illinois law would govern." When the employer ceased doing
business, the insurance terminated, since the insured decedent was
not notified of his statutory right to convert the group policy into
individual coverage. Under Illinois law, however, the defendant
was not required to provide the insured with affirmative notice of
conversion rights. The insured's widow and the beneficiary under
the group policy thereafter sued the group policy sponsor under a
theory of negligence.45 Both the insured and his widow were domiciled in New York, the former employer of the insured was located
in New York, and the certificate of insurance was delivered in New
York. 4" Although the court recognized that "the paramount interests in this litigation weigh heavily in favor of the beneficiary and
support application of New York law,' 7 the court upheld the
choice of Illinois law, stating that:
3 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957).
Id. at 381, 144 N.E.2d at 379, 165 N.Y.S.2d at 485-86; see also Woodling v. Garrett
Corp., 813 F.2d 543, 551 (2d Cir. 1987) (choice of Connecticut law upheld); Zerman v. Ball,
735 F.2d 15, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1984) (choice of New York law upheld); Associated Metals &
Minerals Corp. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 590 F. Supp. 18, 20 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1431
(2d Cir. 1983) (choice of Pennsylvania law upheld); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Chopp-Wincraft Printing Specialties, 587 F. Supp. 557, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (choice of Illinois law
upheld).
42 See, e.g., Reger v. National Ass'n of Bedding Mfrs., 83 Misc. 2d 527, 539, 372
N.Y.S.2d 97, 114 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1975); Kahn v. Great-West Assurance Co.,
61 Misc. 2d 918, 923, 307 N.Y.S.2d 238, 244 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1970).
1383 Misc. 2d 527, 372 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1975).
11Id. at 538, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13; see Gruson, supra note 2, at 330.
4 Reger, 83 Misc. 2d at 528, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 104; see Gruson, supra note 2, at 330-31.
46 Reger, 83 Misc. 2d at 542 n.10, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 116 n.10; see Gruson, supra note 2, at
331.
"" Reger, 83 Misc. 2d at 542, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 116 (footnote omitted); see Gruson, supra
note 2, at 331.
40

41
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The courts of this state have recognized, as controlling, contractual provisions pertaining to which state law governs, where the
law chosen bears a reasonable relationship to the transaction ....
Even our [paramount interest analysis] gives way to a fundamental fairness rule whereby the laws of the jurisdiction under
which the parties have patterned their conduct prevails ....At
bar, it is clear that the parties to the master policy all believed
that Illinois law applied and their expectations should not be accorded any less weight than those of the insured or his
48
beneficiary.
In Kahn v. Great-West Life Assurance Co.,4 e a similar action
was brought by the beneficiary of a group life insurance policy
against a Canadian insurer, contesting coverage on grounds that
the insured, a New York domiciliary, had made fraudulent misrepresentations in the application.5 0 The group policy and the certificate provided that Illinois law would govern.5 1 Under Illinois law,
the insurer had a complete defense based on the misrepresentation.2 Under New York law, however, the insurer could not assert
such a defense.53 The New York court held that the choice of Illinois law was enforceable. 5 '
The thread of principle in Reger and Kahn underscores the
need for enforcing choice-of-law provisions in group insurance
cases, as it is not "practical to have such [policies] governed by
' 55
different laws depending on the persons insured.
In sum, it appears that New York courts applying the reasonable relationship test tend to enforce choice-of-law clauses. These
" Reger, 83 Misc. 2d at 539, 543, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 114, 117 (citation omitted); see
Gruson, supra note 2, at 331.
" 61 Misc. 2d 918, 307 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1970).
50 Id. at 919, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
Id. at 920, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
Id. at 919-20, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
Id. at 919, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
Id. at 918, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
Gruson, supra note 2, at 332 n.32; cf. Zanfardino v. E-System, 652 F. Supp. 637, 639
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (employment contract scenario). But see Antinora v. Nationwide Life Ins.
Co., 76 Misc. 2d 599, 350 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Monroe County Ct. 1973) (Choice of Ohio law in
governing law clause not upheld in group insurance dispute involving conversion rights).
However, Antinora is distinguishable because the insurer, who was also the employer, withheld a premium from the insured's paycheck after the termination of employment, but
within the 31-day grace period, and the claim arose during that period. See id. at 600, 350
N.Y.S.2d at 865.
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courts are inclined to respect the parties' autonomy, 56 exercise a
minimum level of scrutiny, and refuse to conduct extended "grouping of contacts" or "paramount interest" analyses.57
2.

Grouping of Contacts

Courts following the grouping of contacts approach in interpreting choice-of-law clauses apply a heightened level of scrutiny
in conducting their choice-of-law analysis. These cases treat the
clause as a relevant but not determinative factor.
In Haag v. Barnes,58 the New York Court of Appeals applied
the grouping of contacts approach to an agreement which contained a choice-of-law clause. Although decided four years after
A.S. Rampel, Inc., the court of appeals in Haag did not distinguish its precedent as it determined the enforceability of a stipulation that Illinois law would govern the terms of a child support
agreement between a putative father in Chicago and a mother who
resided in New York.5 9 The provision in the agreement which provided for the waiver of all causes of action of the mother against
the father in exchange for certain support payments was valid
"6See, e.g., Waraco,

Inc. v. Farkas, 664 F. Supp. 738, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (guarantors'

liability determined under Connecticut law); Avant Petroleum, Inc. v. Banque Paribus, 652
F. Supp. 542, 545-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (law of England used to determine secured creditor's
rights to impleaded fund); Alco Standard Corp. v. Schmidt Bros., 647 F. Supp. 4, 7
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (New York law used to determine right to terminate contract without exercising good faith); Sprung v. Coutin, 637 F. Supp. 191, 192-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (New York
law governs former husband's duty to pay alimony to ex-wife cohabiting with man in California); Mon-Shore Management v. Family Media, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 186, 193 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (New York law determined rights of franchises against publisher and franchisor).
57 See, e.g., Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d 543, 551 (2d Cir. 1987) (Connecticut
law used to determine validity and enforceability of release in wrongful death action); Gray
v. American Express Co., 743 F.2d 10, 16-17 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (right to notice of cancellation
of credit card decided under New York law); Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 19-20 (2d Cir.
1984) (securities purchaser waived right to use any law except New York law to determine
legal rate of interest on margin account); First Commodity Traders v. Heinold Commodities,
591 F. Supp. 812, 815 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 766 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1985) (Illinois law
governed right to terminate contract without clear termination date); Walter E. Heiler &
Co. v. Chopp-Wincraft Printing Specialties, 587 F. Supp. 557, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Illinois
law validated contract that would be void in New York due to usury); General Pub. Util.
Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 547 F. Supp. 842, 843 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Pennsylvania law
applies to question of strict liability limitations on contract to purchase nuclear power
plant); R-T Leasing Corp. v. Ethyl Corp., 494 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (Virginia
law determined meaning of "usual wear and tear" in contract dispute alleging misuse of
leased railroad cars).
58 9 N.Y.2d 554, 175 N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
59 Id. at 557-58, 175 N.E.2d at 442, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 66-67.
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under Illinois law. 0 New York law, however, mandated judicial review of the agreement for fairness."1 The mother brought suit in
New York seeking increased support payments. 2 In upholding the
father's motion to dismiss and applying Illinois law, the Court of
Appeals concluded that:
The traditional view was that the law governing a contract is to
be determined by the intention of the parties. The more modern
view is that "the courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the
parties' intention or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon the law of the place 'which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute.'" Whichever of
these views one applies in this case, however, the answer is the
same, namely, that Illinois law applies.
The agreement, in so many words, recites that it "shall in all
respects be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of
the State of Illinois" and, since it was also drawn and signed by
the complainant in Illinois, the traditional conflicts rule would,
without doubt, treat these factors as conclusive and result in applying Illinois law. But, even if the parties' intention and the
place of the making of the contract are not given decisive effect,
they are nevertheless to be given heavy weight in determining
which jurisdiction "'has the most significant contacts with the
matter in dispute.'" And, when these important factors are taken
together with other of the "significant contacts" in the case, they
likewise point to Illinois law. 3
Therefore, a court will apply the substantive law of the jurisdiction
which has the most significant contacts with the transaction if it
adheres to the grouping of contracts test in a case involving a
choice-of-law clause. Furthermore, under this approach, the intent
of the parties is a factor considered, although not dispositive of the
issue per se. 4
Although the Haag court upheld the parties' choice of law,
New York courts have since utilized its reasoning to defeat govId. at 558, 175 N.E.2d at 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 68; see Gruson, supra note 2, at 328.
61 Haag, 9 N.Y.2d at 558-59, 175 N.E.2d at 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 68; see Gruson, supra

note 2, at 328.
62 Haag, 9 N.Y.2d at 558, 175 N.E.2d at 443, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
63 Id. at 559-60, 175 N.E.2d at 443-44, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 68-69 (citations omitted) (quoting Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 160, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (1954)); see Gruson, supra note 2,
at 328.
64 Gruson, supra note 2, at 329; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
481-82 (1985) (choice of law could be considered in determining personal jurisdiction).

19881

CHOICE-OF-LAW

erning law clauses.6 5 For example, in Keystone Leasing Corp. v.
Peoples Protective Life Insurance Co., 6 a federal diversity action
was brought to enforce a guaranty contract. The contract provided
that New York law would govern.6 7 However, the defendant insurer alleged that the guaranty was unenforceable since Tennessee
law governed the contract.6 8 Under the applicable Tennessee insurance and corporation statutes,6 9 the agreement was unenforceable. 70 The Eastern District of New York reached the conclusion
that Tennessee substantive law governed the issue of whether the
guaranty should be enforced 1 by applying New York's conflict of
law rules. 2
Another leading case in which a New York court refused to
61For examples of other New York cases that have upheld the validity of choice-of-law
clauses based on the grouping of contacts approach evinced in Haag v. Barnes, see Hawes
Office Sys. v. Wang Laboratories, 537 F. Supp. 939, 941-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (choice of Massachusetts law upheld); La Beach v. Beatrice Foods Co., 461 F. Supp. 152, 155-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (choice of Illinois law upheld). See also Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Video Innovations,
Inc., 730 F.2d 50, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1984) (although parties' contract provided for Illinois law,
court sustained stipulation that New York should govern since there was no material difference in regard to issue in question).
66 514 F. Supp. 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
17 Id. at 847.
18 Id. The plaintiff was a New York-based corporation and the defendant insurer was
incorporated in Tennessee. Id. at 843.
19 Section 48-1-403 of the Tennessee Code provided: "A corporation shall have power to
guarantee obligations of any other entity and to secure such guarantees by mortgage, pledge
or otherwise by vote of a majority of the entire board, unless such power is reserved to the
shareholders or members in the charter." TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1-403 (1984) (repealed 1988
and replaced by § 48-13-102(6), effective January 1, 1988).
Tennessee Code section 56-3-103 provided that:
No director or other officer of any domestic insurance company organized under
the laws of Tennessee ... shall accept, or be the beneficiary of, either directly or
remotely, any fee, brokerage, commission, gift, or other consideration for or on
account of any loan, deposit, purchase, sale, payment, or exchange made by or in
behalf of such company, or be pecuniarily interested in any such purchase, sale, or
loan, either as borrower, principal, co-principal, agent, or beneficiary ....
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-3-103 (1984).
70 See Keystone, 514 F. Supp. at 848. Under section 48-1-403, the requisite board action was not accomplished. Id.
71 Id. One commentator has argued that the Keystone court "should have applied New
York [substantive] law in accordance with the governing-law clause in the guaranty."
Gruson, supra note 4, at 213 n.27.
72 The Keystone court was a federal district court sitting by reason of diversity jurisdiction. Since 1941, federal courts presented with a conflict of laws issue in diversity cases have
applied the conflicts rule of the state in which they sit. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). Because the Keystone court was sitting in New York, the
court applied New York's conflict of laws rule (i.e., the grouping of contacts test evinced in
Haag v. Barnes).
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enforce a choice-of-law clause by applying a grouping of contacts
approach was Harmonay, Inc. v. Binks Manufacturing Co. 7 ' In
Harmonay, a subcontractor brought suit against a contractor to recover damages for delay. The parties' subcontract provided for Illinois law, the state of defendant's principal place of business, to
apply.7 4 Although the contract was executed in Michigan, the place
of performance was New York. 5 All negotiations for extra work
took place in New York and the prime contract was governed by
New York law.76 Moreover, the plaintiff was incorporated under
New York law and maintained its principal place of business in
New York. 7 Citing Haag v. Barnes, s the court declined to uphold
the choice of Illinois law and held that New York law governed.7 9
In so doing, the court concluded that although the choice-of-law
clause was a relevant factor, it was not determinative. 0
As progeny of Haag v. Barnes, the Keystone and Harmonay
cases indicate that a growing number of New York courts have declined to follow the lower-scrutiny approach of the reasonable relationship test evinced by the court of appeals in A.S. Rampell, Inc.
v. Hyster Co. 81 In so doing, these courts have applied a grouping of
contacts analysis similar to that applied in cases without a choiceof-law clause. 2
3.

Paramount Interest Analysis

The New York Court of Appeals has never applied the paramount interest analysis approach to a contract dispute involving a
1 597 F. Supp. 1014, 1024-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1025.

74
75

76
77

Id.
Id.
Id.

9 N.Y.2d 554, 175
11 Harmonay, 597 F.
80 Id.
8, 3 N.Y.2d 369, 144
82 See, e.g., Carlos v.
7.

N.E.2d 441, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961).
Supp. at 1025.
N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957).
Philips Business Sys., 556 F. Supp. 769, 774 n.4 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd,

742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir. 1983) (declining to enforce parties' choice of New York law, court
applied laws of New Jersey, Connecticut, and Ohio, which were states in which parties who
stood "to lose the most" did business); Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Z.I.D. Assocs., 506 F.
Supp. 101, 107-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (declining to enforce choice of Tennessee law, court applied New York law because "substantial proportion" of relevant contacts were in New
York, and because enforcement of contract would be contrary to New York public policy);
H.B. Fuller Co. v. Hagen, 363 F. Supp. 1325, 1331 (W.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[c]onsidering all of the
contacts ... the law of New York is controlling" and not parties' choice of Minnesota law).
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choice-of-law clause. Recently, however, two New York-based federal district courts during diversity actions have employed the paramount interest analysis to set aside the parties' choice of law. '
In Triad FinancialEstablishment v. Tumpane Co., 4 a marketing consultant organization brought an action against a subcontractor based on a military contract seeking commissions allegedly
owed when the organization obtained subcontracts for the defendant. The plaintiff was a Liechtenstein entity and the defendant,
although incorporated in New York, maintained its principal office
in Vancouver, Washington. 5 Although the parties' marketing
agreement expressly provided that New York law should govern,
the defendant contended Saudi Arabian law applied. 8 In its conflict of laws analysis, the court considered several factors: (1) defendant maintained only two employees in New York but employed 3,750 in Saudi Arabia; (2) the parties' relevant agreements
were neither executed nor performed in New York; (3) the plaintiff, though organized in Liechtenstein, characterized itself as a
"Saudi sales agent;" and (4) the subcontracts were negotiated and
performed in Saudi Arabia.8 7 Based on these factors, the court concluded that it was not bound by the parties' choice of law since
that choice "would override the policies of a state with a materially
greater interest in the controversy." 8 Applying the paramount interest analysis, the court found that Saudi Arabia had a "compelling interest" in having its law applied,8° since in 1975 ithad
adopted by decree an anticorruption measure prohibiting the payment of agent's fees on contracts for arms and related services.e"
'3See Triad Fin. Establishment v. Tumpare Co., 611 F. Supp. 157, 162-64 (N.D.N.Y.
1985); Southern Int'l Sales Co. v. Potter & Brumfield, 410 F. Supp. 1339, 1341-43 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
81 611 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1985).
65 Id. at 159.
"6 Id. at 163.
87 Id.
81 Id. at 162.
81 Id. at 163.
"0 Id. In relevant part, the decree provided that:
1. No firm holding a contract with the Saudi Government for the supply of arms
or equipment required by the Saudi Government may pay any sum as a commission to any intermediary, sales agent, representative, or broker. This prohibition
shall apply regardless of the nationality of the firm or the nationality of the intermediary, sales agent, representative, or broker. It shall apply also whether the
contract was concluded directly between the Saudi Government and the firm or
through a third-party state. No recognition is accorded to any commission agreement previously concluded by any such firm with any party, and such agreement
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The court recognized that had it enforced the parties' choice of
New York law, the "strong policy" behind that decree would have
been rendered "meaningless." 91 Furthermore, since New York had
no substantial stake in the litigation, with little or no interest in
upholding the plaintiff's claim, the court concluded that Saudi
Arabian law should govern. 92
A similar rationale was employed by the Southern District of
New York in Southern InternationalSales Co. v. Potter & Brumfield.93 In that case, a Puerto Rico dealer sued an Indiana manufacturer for wrongful termination of an exclusive sales representation contract. The parties' contract provided that Indiana law
should govern.94 However, Puerto Rico had enacted the Dealers
Contract Act, which prohibited unilateral terminations absent just
cause. 5 Although the court found that the dispute was "reasonably
related" to Indiana, the court held that Puerto Rico had a para-mount interest in having its law applied in determining the validity of the manufacturer's termination of the representation agreement.96 In comparison, Indiana's interest in having its law govern
the dispute was deemed to be minor.
Thus the Triad and Southern cases demonstrate that New
York courts are willing to apply foreign law despite the parties'
choice of law if the foreign jurisdiction is deemed to have a paramount interest in the dispute.9 In such cases, the parties' intent
shall have no validity vis-a-vis the Saudi Government.
2. If among the foreign firms mentioned in paragraph 1 above there are any that
are obligated by commission agreements that they have made, they are to stop
payment of the commissions due after having been warned by this decision ....
Id.
Id.
Id. at 163-64. Under the conflict-of-laws concept of "depacage," however, the court
only applied Saudi Arabian law for fees claimed after September 17, 1975, the date on which
the Saudi decree was adopted. Id. at 164. New York law governed fee claims which arose
prior to that date. Id. "Depacage" has been defined as "applying the rules of different states
to determine different issues." Reese, Depacage:A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law,
73 COLUM. L. REv. 58, 58 (1973). After the relevant factors are weighed, "[tihe court determines which law should apply with respect to each particular issue." Triad FinancialEstablishment, 611 F. Supp. at 164 n.6.
93 410 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
92

"

Id. at 1341.

Id. at 1340-41.
g' Id. at 1341-43.

Id. at 1342.
Accord RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) (1971); Prebble,
Choice of Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of Contracts:A Comparisonof English
and American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 512-14 (1973)
'8
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will not determine the scope of the legislative jurisdiction of states
which have not delegated that power to them.9 9 However, judicial
willingness to intervene has produced confusion and unpredictability. As a result, it is clear that courts have often denied parties the
"use of the only practical device for bringing certainty and predictability into multistate contracts"-a choice-of-law provision. 10 0
III.

CONTRACTUAL LIIITATIONS ON CHOICE OF LAW

The parties' autonomy to stipulate a choice of governing law
in their contract has far-reaching qualifications in New York. As
discussed above, some courts require that the chosen law have a
reasonable relationship to the contract. 101 On the other hand,
courts employing the grouping of contacts test require the chosen
law to have substantial contacts with the disputed issue. 0 2 Moreover, courts that apply the paramount interest analysis go further
in requiring that the chosen law be tied to the state whose governmental interest has the highest stake in determining the issue. 0 3
This section discusses three additional restraints that may exist in
deciding whether or not to enforce the parties' freedom to agree on
the law governing their contract.
A.

Adhesion Contracts

Although the New York Court of Appeals has not spoken on
the issue, it is probable that a New York court will not enforce a
choice-of-law provision in a contract which is not the product of an
(discussing public policy of jurisdictions other than forum's); Sedler, The Contracts Provision of the Restatement (Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 COLum. L. REv. 279, 29498 (1972) (discussing conflicting governmental policy).
" See Note, supra note 3, at 1667-68. It has been observed that:
One might expect that such a question, involving, as it does, the scope of the
states' legislative power vis-a-vis one another, would be decided by the Supreme
Court. But, although the Court flirted with the possibility of constitutionaizing
interstate choice of law over a generation ago, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague
confirmed and extended the subsequent trend in Supreme Court decisions widening the area of freedom that states enjoy in deciding choice-of-law issues.
Id. at 1662-63 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1163 n.20 (discussing due process and full
faith and credit clauses with respect to conflicts).
100 Reese, Power of Parties to Choose Law Governing their Contract, 1960 PRoc. AM.
Soc. INT'L L. 49, 51; see Note, supra note 3, at 1661.
" See supra notes 40-57 and accompanying text.
102 See supra notes 58-82 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 83-100 and accompanying text.
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arm's length negotiation. 10 4 Should the court find any indicia of
"fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power" against
the party who challenges the validity of the clause, it may label the
agreement as an adhesion contract and refuse to uphold the
provision. 10
The time-honored precedent which evinced this principle is
the seminal decision of Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co. 0 6 In Fricke, the
defendant steamship owner, on a summary judgment motion,
moved to dismiss the plaintiff passenger's suit for personal injuries. 10 ' The contract of passage, which was printed in English, provided that the law of the United States governed, and reduced the
statute of limitations to one year from the date of injury.'
The
plaintiff, who failed to bring suit within the prescribed time period,
was a German national, entirely nonconversant in the English language.' Moreover, the contract of passage was purchased in Germany for a round trip to the United States. 110 As a result, the
plaintiff challenged the choice-of-law clause and argued that German law be applied."'"
In denying defendant's motion to dismiss, the court found
that the contract of passage was "not formulated as a result of the
give-and-take of bargaining where the desires of one party are balanced by those of the other.""' 2 Rather, the terms and conditions
were offered by the defendant on a "take-it-or-leave-it basis.""'
Because the plaintiff purchased the tickets in Germany, the court
stated that he "probably felt that German law controlled.""" The
court concluded that because the defendant did not provide the
illiterate plaintiff with a translation, or other knowledge of what
104 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 358-60; see also Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 12-13, 17 (1972) (choice of forum upheld in arm's length transaction).
105Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12; cf. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (discussion of adhesion contracts in connection with forum-selection clauses); Gaskin v. Stumm
Handel GmbH, 390 F. Supp. 361, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (forum selection clause enforced
when criteria of Bremen court satisfied).
"1 151 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
,07Id. at 466.

108Id.
209 Id.
110 Id.

"I Id. at 467. Plaintiff's action would have been barred under the law of the United
States. Id. at 466.
112

Id. at 467.

113

Id.

114

Id. at 468.

19881

CHOICE-OF-LAW

the contract included, the choice-of-law clause was not binding. 115
As a result, the court held that German law governed the statute of
limitations question.1 6
B. Validation Rule
Although not common, parties may occasionally stipulate a
governing law in their contract which renders the agreement invalid, either in whole or in part. 1 7 Some commentators have argued

that a governing law clause should be disregarded if it points to
the law of a jurisdiction which would invalidate the contract."'
However, "[a] rule of validation which would supersede all governing law clauses is not part of New York law," 19 except in cases
involving usury. 11°
In General Electric Credit Corp. v. Beyerlein,'21 an equipment

lease permitted the lessor to assign its interests under the lease,
and provided further that the assignee would not be responsible
for the lessor's obligations.' 22 Under section 9-206(1) of New York's
Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C."), this clause was binding
upon the lessee, subject only to "any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or lessees of consumer
goods."'2 3 However, the lease contained a choice-of-law clause stip115 Id.
11 Id.;

accord Harmonay, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 597 F. Supp. 1014, 1025 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (refusing to enforce parties' choice of Illinois law because of contract's substantial
contacts with New York, court noted that choice-of-law clause was found in the defendant's
"standard printed form"), aff'd, 762 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1985). Some commentators have argued that choice-of-law clauses in adhesion contracts may be stricken or limited as violative
of the forum's public policy. See RESTATEMIENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§

187 com-

ment b, at 562 (1971); Gruson, supra note 2, at 360.
1'7 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 361-62.
11' See, e.g., Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IowA L. REv. 399, 408, 410
(1968) ("stipulation of invalidating law should be disregarded as an obvious error and the
proper law chosen by some other means"); see also Prebble, supra note 98, at 527 ("any
stipulation of otherwise inapplicable law that clearly frustrates the intent of the parties
should be disregarded") (quoting Maw, Applicable Law and Conflict Avoidance in International Contracts, 25 N.Y.C.B.A. RECORD 365, 374-75 (1970)).
" Gruson, supra note 2, at 361.
110 See, e.g., Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Chopp-Wincraft Printing Specialties, 587 F.
Supp. 557, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("the forum state chooses the state whose usury statute
would sustain the contract in full or else impose the lightest penalty for usury from the set
of all states that have a substantial relationship to the contract").
55 Misc. 2d 724, 286 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1967), aff'd, 30 App.
Div. 2d 762, 292 N.Y.S.2d 32 (4th Dep't 1968).
122 Id. at 725, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
123 N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-206(l) (McKinney 1964).
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ulating Massachusetts law.2 4 After the assignee sued the lessee for
overdue payments, the lessee interposed a defense that the equipment did not function properly. 2 5 Denying the assignee's motion
for summary judgment, the court held that the lease's exculpatory
126
clause was unenforceable under Massachusetts law.
C. Public Policy
1.

Choice of Foreign Law

A New York court may limit the enforceability of a choice-oflaw clause which stipulates that a particular foreign law govern the
contract if it finds that the law is violative of the public policy of
New York. 27 However, the public policy violated must be deemed
particularly important before the choice-of-law clause will be invalidated. 2 s Such a clause will not be ignored merely on grounds that
the chosen law is "obnoxious and offensive."'12 9 The test for invalidating the foreign law is whether its application would result in
"approval of a transaction which is inherently vicious, wicked or
12,

Beyerlein, 55 Misc. 2d at 725, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 352.

125Id.

26Id. at 727, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 353-54; accord A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 3 N.Y.2d
369, 381, 144 N.E.2d 371, 379, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475, 486 (1957); see Painton & Co. v. Bourns,
Inc., 309 F. Supp. 271, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.
1971).
'
Gruson, supra note 4, at 220-21; see, e.g., Nederlandse Draadindustrie NDI B.V. v.
Grand Pre-Stressed Corp., 466 F. Supp. 846, 851 (E.D.N.Y.) (New York law applied, absent
contrary public policy), afl'd, 614 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1979); Dougherty v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 266 N.Y. 71, 90, 193 N.E. 897, 903 (1934) (enforcement of insurance provision requiring dispute be resolved under Russian law not violative of public policy); Reger v.
National Ass'n of Bedding Mfrs., 83 Misc. 2d 527, 541, 372 N.Y.S.2d 97, 115-16 (Sup. CL
Westchester County 1975) ("[tjhe rule to be applied is simple: in group insurance policies a
choice of law provision should be given effect unless it contravenes [New York] public policy"); cf. Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp., 397 F. Supp. 63, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (court
considered not only New York public policy, but policy of any "state which has a materially
greater interest than the chosen state in the determination").
28 Gruson, supra note 4, at 221; see, e.g., B.M. Heede, Inc. v. West India Mach. &
Supply Co., 272 F. Supp. 236, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (choice-of-law clause enforced provided
"fundamental public policy of the forum [state] is not vitiated"); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Enco Assocs., 83 Misc. 2d 552, 562, 370 N.Y.S.2d 338, 348 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1975) (Michigan law not offensive to "strong public policy"), aff'd, 54 App. Div. 2d 13, 385
N.Y.S.2d 613 (2d Dep't 1976), modified, 43 N.Y.2d 389, 372 N.E.2d 555, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767
(1977).
129 Gruson, supra note 4, at 221 (quoting Kleve v. Basler Lebens-Versicherungs-Gesellschaft, 182 Misc. 776, 782, 45 N.Y.S.2d 882, 887 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1943)); see French v.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, 23 N.Y.2d 46, 56, 242 N.E.2d 704, 711, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433, 443
(1968).
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130
immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral sense.'
Only a few New York courts have denied enforcement of a
choice of foreign law clause because the foreign law violated New
York public policy. For example, in F.A. Straus & Co. v. Canadian
Pacific Railway Co., 131 a provision in a bill of lading exempted the
carrier from any liability for negligence and further provided that
the contract should be governed by English law. 3 2 Under English
law, the clause was valid,1 33 but the New York Court of Appeals
held the exculpatory clause void because it contravened New York
34
public policy.
In Antinora v. Nationwide Life Insurance Co.,'3 5 the court
held that a New York statute requiring that affirmative notice of
conversion rights be given to the holder of a group insurance policy
upon termination of employment reflected the public policy of
New York. Because the policy holder was domiciled in New York,
the court concluded that New York's public policy prevailed over
the insurance contract's choice-of-law clause stipulating that Ohio
36
law govern.'

130 Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d 9, 13, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212, 254
N.Y.S.2d 527, 529 (1964) (New York public policy did not preclude judicial enforcement in
New York of gambling debts validly incurred in Puerto Rico); see also Mitchell v. New York
Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 208, 214, 461 N.E.2d 285, 288, 473 N.Y.S.2d 148, 151 (1984) (stipulation
waiving New York statute concerning protection of non-settling tortfeasor not violative of
public policy); Tuthill Fin. v. Cartaya, 133 App. Div. 2d 343, 344, 519 N.Y.S.2d 243, 244 (2d
Dep't 1987) (mem.) (because note was governed by and valid under Connecticut law, it was
not usurious under New York law); Towne Funding Co. v. Macchia, 120 App. Div. 2d 519,
519, 501 N.Y.S.2d 717, 717 (2d Dep't 1986) (mem.) (Connecticut law governed mortgagesecured loan allegedly usurious under New York law); Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Catalano, 51
Misc. 2d 407, 411, 273 N.Y.S.2d 310, 315 (Columbia County Ct. 1966) (public policy did not
preclude enforcement of a note which was usurious under New York law, but was validly
issued in Massachusetts), afl'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 595, 282 N.Y.S.2d 214 (3d Dep't 1967).
254 N.Y. 407, 173 N.E. 564 (1930).
Id. at 410-11, 414, 173 N.E. at 565, 567.
133 Id. at 414, 173 N.E. at 567.
3 Id. at 416, 173 N.E. at 568; see also Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 3940, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135-36 (1961) (Massachusetts' limitation of
wrongful death damages violative of New York Constitution); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466,
472-74, 3 N.E.2d 597, 598-99 (1936) (Connecticut law violative of New York spousal tort
immunity policy); Compania de Inversiones Internacionales v. Industrial Mortgage Bank of
Finland, 269 N.Y. 22, 31-32, 198 N.E. 617, 621 (1935) (clause in contract which required
payment in gold was invalidated as violative of public policy), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 705
(1936).
"' 76 Misc. 2d 599, 350 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Monroe County Ct. 1973).
15
Id. at 605, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 870; accord Oakley v. National W. Life Ins. Co., 294 F.
Supp. 504, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But see supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
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In Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Z.LD. Associates,1 37 a bank
brought suit against a corporation and its president for brokerage
fees earned on loans it had brokered on the defendants' behalf.
The parties' agreement provided that Tennessee law should govern. 13 8 Plaintiff contended that under Tennessee law, it was not
required to obtain a broker's license. 13 9 Under New York law, however, plaintiff was required to obtain a broker's license, which it
never did. 1 40 After determining that New York was the forum
which had the most substantial contacts with the dispute,'" the
court held that enforcement of the choice-of-law clause would violate New York public policy against unlicensed brokers.'4 2 As a result, the court applied New York law and accordingly dismissed
143
the complaint.
2.

Choice of New York Law

The New York Court of Appeals has yet to rule on whether
the public policy of another jurisdiction may override an otherwise
valid choice of New York law in the parties' contract. 4 4 However,
since the enactment of General Obligations Law section 5-14011,5
in 1984, it appears that the public policy of New York would man46
date enforcement of such clauses.
Interestingly, in Triad FinancialEstablishment v. Tumpane
Co.,147 the court did not refer to General Obligations Law section
5-1401. Had it done so, it would have been faced with the conflicting public policies of New York and Saudi Arabia. On the one
hand, it was New York public policy, as evinced by Section 5-1401,
137 506 F. Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

'38 Id. at 107.
at 102, 108.
139 Id.
140

Id. at 103. New York law requires licensing of real estate brokers under section 440-

a of the Real Property Law. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 440-a (McKinney Supp. 1988).
See Guaranty Mortgage, 506 F. Supp. at 107.
142 See id. at 107-08.
See id. at 108.
144 See Gruson, supra note 4, at 222.
141 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 1984); see supra notes 8 and 10 and
accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Credit Francais Int'l, S.A. v. Sociedad Financiera de Comercio, C.A., 128
Misc. 2d 564, 568-69, 490 N.Y.S.2d 670, 674-76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985) (§§ 5-1401 and
5-1402 embody policy enforcing choice-of-law clause "absent a strong showing that it should
be set aside"); see also supra note 10 (test of § 5-1401).
1,7 611 F. Supp. 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); see supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text
(discussion of facts of Triad).
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to enforce choice-of-law clauses providing that New York law govSaudi Arabia's public policy outlawed
ern. 148 On the other hand,
149
the parties' contract.
By reason of the New York statute, resolution of this dispute
should have been determined by enforcing the choice-of-law
clause. The due process clause of the United States Constitution5 "
may be used to prevent a state from unreasonably invoking its own
law, 51 and the full faith and credit clause 5 2 may be used to compel a state to apply another state's law. 53 However, only principles
M
of comity encourage a state to apply the law of a foreign nation.
When foreign legislation conflicts with New York public policy, the
court of appeals has stated that New York law should prevail.1 55
According to the legislative memoranda which accompanied the
passage of section 5-1401, New York State has a strong interest in
enforcmfig parties' choice of New York law to govern their contrac1'l N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988). The statute exempts
contracts "for labor or personal services." Id. The parties' contract was a brokerage agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to obtain military contracts for the defendant with an
American contractor doing business in Saudi Arabia. See Triad, 611 F. Supp. at 159. It is
unclear whether the brokerage agreement came within the purview of this statutory exemption. It appears that the exemption may have been intended to deal only with choice-of-law
clauses commonly appearing in employment contracts. See, e.g., Hunter v. H.D. Lee Co, 563
F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); H.B. Fuller Co. v. Hagen, 363 F. Supp. 1325, 1331
(W.D.N.Y. 1973). If such limited construction applies, then the contract at issue in Triad
should have been governed by section 5-1401 of the General Obligations Law.
"' See Triad, 611 F. Supp. at 163-64.
0 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
1"1 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410-11, (1930); Atlas Credit Corp. v. Ezrine, 25
N.Y.2d 219, 230, 250 N.E.2d 474, 481, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382, 391-92 (1969); see Kirgis, The
Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94,
96 (1976); Note, supra note 3, at 1663.
12 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1.
Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159 (1932); see Jackson, Full
Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 24-34
(1945); Note, supra note 3, at 1663.
I" See J. Zeevi & Sons v. Grindlays Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 220, 227-28, 333 N.E.2d 168, 173,
371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 899, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975); Note, supra note 3, at 1663 n.20.
Enforcement of another nation's law is premised on the doctrine of comity. Grindlays Bank,
37 N.Y.2d at 228, 333 N.E.2d at 173, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 899. Comity has been defined as the
reciprocal courtesy which one nation owes to another, presupposing good relations and assuming the prevalence of equity and justice. See Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 258, 139 N.E. 259, 260 (1923). In the legal sense, however,
comity is neither a matter of absolute obligation nor of mere courtesy and good will, but
rather, a matter of policy. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); Bachman v.
Mejias, 1 N.Y.2d 575, 581, 136 N.E.2d 866, 869, 154 N.Y.S.2d 903, 907 (1956).
11" Grindlays Bank, 37 N.Y.2d at 228, 333 N.E.2d at 173, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
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tual dislputes. 158157As a result, the Triad court should have applied
New York law.

In sum, the right to choose a law to govern a contract is limited by three restraints: (a) adhesion contracts; (b) the rule of validation; and (c) public policy considerations.
IV.

SCOPE OF GOVERNING LAW CLAUSES

The parlance of conflicts law often refers to the terms "whole
law" and "substantive law." The term "whole law" refers to the
totality of a jurisdiction's law, including its conflict of law rules. 5 '
"Substantive law" refers merely to a jurisdiction's local law, including, inter alia, statutes and case law. 59 Mindful of this distinction, the issue becomes whether parties who adopt a choice-of-law
clause intend to be bound by the state's "whole" or "substantive"
law. 6' The rule in New York is that the law referred to in a choiceof-law clause only includes the substantive law of the chosen jurisdiction."8 ' If New York is the forum, the courts will invariably apply New York's conflict of law rules. 1 62 This practice usually sustains the parties' intent because application of the chosen
jurisdiction's conflict rules may result in a finding that a different
"' New York has adopted other statutory measures which encourage parties to incorporate choice-of-law clauses into their contracts. Under N.Y. U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (McKinney
1964), parties are empowered to adopt a choice-of-law clause so long as the chosen law bears
a reasonable relationship to the transaction. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 341-52. Moreover,
section 7-1.10 of the New York Estates, Powers and Trust Law provides that nondomiciliary
settlers are empowered to stipulate that New York law shall govern the disposition of the
personal property of a trust. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 7-1.10 (McKinney 1967).
"7 Where there is a conflict between New York's public policy and the application of
comity, the New York court's own sense of justice and equity as embodied in its own public
policy must prevail. GrindlaysBank, 37 N.Y.2d at 228, 333 N.E.2d at 173, 371 N.Y.S.2d at
899.
158 Gruson, supra note 4, at 222 & n.83; see, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 17 App. Div. 2d
694, 699, 701-02, 230 N.Y.S.2d 114, 121, 125, (4th Dep't 1962) (discussing "whole law" of
foreign state), rev'd on other grounds, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963); In re Estate of Ortiz, 60 Misc. 2d 756, 762, 303 N.Y.S.2d 806, 813 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1969) (defining "whole law").
, See Gruson, supra note 4, at 222 & n.83.
180 Gruson, supra note 2, at 362-64.
161 Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 194 (2d Cir. 1955) (Harlan, J.); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

187(3) comment h, at 569 (1971); Gruson,

supra note 2, at 363.
"I' See, e.g., Woodling v. Garrett Corp., 813 F.2d 543, 551 (2d Cir. 1987) (New York
choice of law adopts substantive not procedural law of foreign state); Hausman v. Buckley,
299 F.2d 696, 700 (2d Cir. 1962) (under New York law, procedural questions are governed by
forum state).
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jurisdiction's substantive law governs.1 63 As a result, if a New York

court is confronted with a governing law clause referring to the law
of a jurisdiction other than New York, which under the New York
conflict of law rules is effective, then New York will not query as to
the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause in the named foreign
jurisdiction and will apply only the substantive law of such foreign
1 64
jurisdiction.
However, even this time-honored rule is subject to certain limited exceptions. 65 One exception concerns the conflicts rule that
New York courts employ concerning the nature and extent of the
corporate powers of entities that are incorporated under the laws
of jurisdictions other than New York. If a foreign corporation is
party to a contract which adopts New York law, a New York court
may apply the "internal affairs rule" to questions such as whether,
under the laws of the jurisdiction in which it is incorporated, the
corporation (a) had the power and authority to enter into and perform the contract, and (b) had properly authorized the execution,
delivery, and performance of the contract. 66 As a result, because
the "internal affairs rule" is a conflicts rule, New York courts interpreting choice-of-law clauses that stipulate New York law may
be compelled to apply the substantive law of another
jurisdiction
6 7
concerning issues of corporate power and capacity.
The leading case in New York is Greenspun v. Lindley 6

in

which the court of appeals was faced with the question whether
the holders of shares in a real estate investment trust had to make
a demand on the trustees prior to commencing suit against the
trustees. The trust was organized under Massachusetts law and the
"I Gruson, supra note 4, at 223-24; see, e.g., Carlos v. Philips Business Sys., 556 F.
Supp. 769, 774-77 (E.D.N.Y.) (applying procedural New York injunction test under substantive law of foreign states), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1432 (2d Cir. 1983).
1' See Gruson, supra note 2, at 367; supra notes 161-62.
,'

Gruson, supra note 4, at 223.
Gruson, supra note 2, at 365-67. Questions of the corporation's internal affairs concern, inter alia, whether the requisite steps were followed in order to authorize a contract,
and whether the requisite officers executed the contract on the entity's behalf. Id. at 366;
see, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 503, 248 N.E.2d 910, 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d
78, 85 (1969); Russian Reins. Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N.Y. 149, 154-55, 147 N.E. 703, 704
(1925).
17 See, e.g., Hart v. General Motors Corp., 129 App. Div. 2d 179, 184-85, 517 N.Y.S.2d
490, 493-94 (1st Dep't 1987) (applying Delaware corporate law); Lewis v. Dicker, 118 Misc.
2d 28, 31-32, 459 N.Y.S.2d 215, 217-18 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1982) (Pennsylvania law
applied).
16836 N.Y.2d 473, 330 N.E.2d 79, 369 N.Y.S.2d 123 (1975).
166
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declaration of trust provided that Massachusetts law governed.169
Under Massachusetts law, the shareholders were required to make
a demand on the trustees prior to commencement of suit. 70 However, the shareholders argued that because the transaction was
substantially related to New York, New York law should govern
the dispute.' The court of appeals upheld the choice-of-law provision and applied Massachusetts law.1 2 In so doing, however, the
court rejected a perfunctory application of the "internal affairs"
choice of law rule; if a foreign corporation or trust has substantial
contacts with New York, courts may apply New York law in order
to determine questions involving corporate power and capacity.'
A recent case in which the internal affairs conflict of law rule
was implicated is Keystone Leasing Corp. v. Peoples Protective
Life Insurance Co.' 7 4 In Keystone, the plaintiff brought an action

against an insurer to enforce a guaranty contract that the insurer
allegedly executed in support of the financial obligations of the insurer's related development company. 175 Although the parties' contract provided that New York law governed, 176 the insurer contended both that Tennessee law applied because the transaction
had substantial contacts with Tennessee and that the contract was
not authorized and executed in accordance with Tennessee's insurance and corporation law.17 Applying a grouping of contacts analysis, the court refused to uphold the parties' choice of New York
law on grounds that Tennessee had the most significant contacts
with the case. 78
Although the Keystone court reached the proper result, it did
not correctly employ the reasoning enunciated by the court of appeals in Greenspun.79 Rather than applying the grouping of contacts test, the court should have properly applied the internal affairs rule. 80 Importantly, the defendant insurer was incorporated
1 9 Id. at 477, 330 N.E.2d at 80, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 125.
1 0 Id. at 478, 330 N.E.2d at 81, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 126.

"' See id. at 477, 330 N.E.2d at 80, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 125-26.
12 Id. at 477, 330 N.E.2d at 80, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 125; accord Skolnik v. Rose, 55 N.Y.2d
964, 965-66, 434 N.E.2d 251, 252, 449 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (1982).
173 Greenspun, 36 N.Y.2d at 477-78, 330 N.E.2d at 81, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
174 514 F. Supp. 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).

See id. at 847.
...See id.
175

171 See id. at 847-48.

'8 See id.
171 See Gruson, supra note 4, at 213 n.27.
10 Id.; see also supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text (discussing Greenspun).

CHOICE-OF-LAW

1988]

under Tennessee law.1 81 The key issue was whether the guaranty
was properly authorized and executed by the insurer.18 2 According
to Greenspun, a New York court faced with this question must
look to the law of the state of the entity's incorporation unless the
transaction has substantial contacts with New York, in which case
New York law will govern. 8 3 Thus, absent significant New York
contacts, the Keystone court would have been constrained by
Greenspun to apply Tennessee law.
In sum, New York courts always apply the forum's own choice
of law rules.18 4 If a choice-of-law clause stipulates another jurisdiction's law, New York courts will apply New York choice of law
rules in order to determine whether the chosen jurisdiction's "substantive" law should govern. New York courts will not, however,
apply another jurisdiction's choice of law rules. Finally, if a New
York court is faced with a choice-of-law clause which stipulates
that New York law will apply, and the issue is whether a corporation or trust organized under another jurisdiction's law properly
authorized, executed, and delivered the contract, the New York
court should apply the law of the entity's jurisdiction of incorporation, unless the transaction has significant contacts with New
York. 85
V.

CONCLUSION

The trend of the world's insurance markets is toward increased globalization. This increased globalization has not only
produced new business opportunities, but has also expanded the
interconnectedness between jurisdictions which were formerly independent and separate. However, the heightened capacity, economics, and profits which are appurtenant to this global expansion
are often tempered by multijurisdictional disputes which may result in litigation or arbitration. With the increased stakes, parties
naturally seek to minimize the degree of uncertainty and unpredictability in connection with their dispute resolution. Nevertheless, the prevailing conflict of law rules, many of which were formulated during a time when commercial relations were more
181

Keystone, 514 F. Supp. at 843.

182 Id.

at 845-47.
Greenspun, 36 N.Y.2d at 477, 330 N.E.2d at 80, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 125-26.
1
See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
,s'
See Gruson, supra note 2, at 378-79.
182
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parochial and less complex, are often ill-equipped to provide the
certainty and predictability that parties require.
As one of the world's leading centers of finance, commerce,
and insurance, New York is often placed in the spotlight of this
problem. Thus, New York has a substantial interest in promoting
stability, continuity, and certainty in connection with the resolution of multijurisdictional disputes which are handled by the
state's legal system.
Because of the dearth of simple and predictable rules as to
applicable law, parties to an agreement should have the right to
agree on the applicable law.1 8 In cases where the parties have
agreed to another jurisdiction's law, New York courts should follow
the reasonable relationship test articulated by the court of appeals
in A.S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co. 1 87 In cases in which the parties
have agreed that New York law should govern, New York courts
should sustain their intent by reason of the strong public policy
expressed in the General Obligations Law. In so doing, New York
courts will be able to reduce the age-old confusion which so often
prevails in the area of conflict of laws.

"I See id.

1873 N.Y.2d 369, 144 N.E.2d 371, 165 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1957).

